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ABSTRACT
A regional development fund (RDF) can be crucial to closing the social and eco-
nomic gaps between countries engaged in economic integration. The purpose of
this article is to explore how an RDF could come about in North America by
drawing on neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist theories. Applying these
theories’ explanations for why an RDF would come about to the creation of the
European Union’s RDF provides lessons for North America that scholars have pre-
viously overlooked. If North America is to benefit from a regional development
policy, a new strategy that draws on intergovernmentalist and side-payments the-
ory, in addition to neofunctionalist and cohesion theory, must be developed.
Key Words: side-payments, cohesion, intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, regional
development fund, interests.
INTRODUCTION
The European Union’s (EU) regional policy has been integral to closing the social
and economic gaps between its rich and poor member states.1 The creation of this
policy provides valuable lessons for other regional trade areas, like the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries, which hope to achieve deeper
levels of economic integration and regional development.
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The purpose of this article is to explore how a regional development fund (RDF)
could come about in North America by drawing on neofunctionalist and intergov-
ernmentalist theories. When North America scholars propose creating an RDF, they
tend to look at the European Union’s application of its European Regional Develop-
ment Fund (ERDF) and use cohesion theory to analyze its effects (Fiess and Fugazza,
2002; Pastor, 2002). They extract lessons learned from the creation and implemen-
tation of the ERDF to propose creating a North America RDF, or as they refer to it, a
North American Investment Fund (NAIF). Pastor states, “From the beginning, Euro-
pean leaders set goals of solidarity and community [which] provided a benchmark
from which they could measure progress….The lesson for North America is to draft
a charter or simply a statement that enunciates a broader vision and set of goals.”
North America scholars’ arguments for a NAIF stem from the principles of cohesion
and community solidarity.
I argue that the current arguments for a NAIF are flawed. While cohesion and
community solidarity are necessary for an RDF’s foundation, they are not sufficient.
Reexamining the ERDF from the competing theoretical perspective of side-payments
and intergovernmentalism provides a different set of lessons for how a NAIF will
come about. I use the theoretical arguments from both perspectives to explain the
creation of an RDF, which is my independent variable and the actual formation of an
RDF, which is my dependent variable. In the first section, I outline the theoretical
debate between cohesion/neofunctionalism and side-payments/intergovernmen-
talism. In the second section, I apply these theoretical arguments to the Eropean
Union’s case to see which theory best explains the ERDF’s formation. In the third sec-
tion, I apply the same theoretical arguments to North America’s case to explain how
an RDF could possibly come about. I maintain that if North America is to benefit from
a regional development policy like the European Union’s, a new strategy that draws
on intergovernmentalist theory, in addition to cohesion theory, must be developed.
THE EUROPEAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUND
As the second largest expenditure in the European Union’s budget, to which all
member states contribute, regional development represents a core policy area for
the union. More than a third of its budget is dedicated to “the reduction of the gaps
in development among the regions and disparities among the citizens in terms of
well-being” (European Commission, 2006). The EU pursues this goal by dispersing
aid through four main funds, the largest of which is the ERDF. Member states may
apply for ERDF grants and loans to fund infrastructure, job creation, investment, and
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local development projects that fall under one of the regional policy’s four objec-
tives. The European Union regional policy’s four objectives are “to help lagging
regions to catch up, restructure declining industrial regions, diversify the economies
of rural areas with declining agriculture, and revitalize declining neighborhoods in
the cities.”
Reports from the European Union’s executive body, the European Commission,2
conclude that a combination of economic integration, growth-oriented national
policies, and the ERDF have reduced disparities among member states. Their reports
state that the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of Ireland, a recipient of ERDF
funds since its accession to the European Union, grew to 118 percent of the European
Union’s average GDP per capita in 2001 from 56 percent in 1973 (European Com-
mission, 2006). For the other three main fund recipients whose GDP per capita was
30-40 percent of the European Union’s average GDP per capita when they entered
the European Union, Spain, Greece, and Portugal, the growth rate of GDP per capi-
ta has been consistently above the European Union average since 1994. Except for
Greece, the GDP per capita has also increased in these countries, as shown in Table 1.
The ERDF also increased public investment in Spain by 3 percent and Greece and
Portugal by around 8 percent (European Commission, 2006). Although some schol-
ars are critical of the ERDF, most agree that the fund, along with other factors, con-
tributed to the poorer countries’ growth and increased public investment (Boldrin
and Canova, 2001; Leonardi, 1995; Sapir, 2004).
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Table 1
POORER COUNTRIES’ GROWTH OF GDP PER CAPITA AS A PERCENT 
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AVERAGE GDP PER CAPITA
GDP per capita upon entry to EU GDP per capita in 2001
Country (percent of EU average) (percent of EU average)
Ireland 1973 – 56 % 118.0.%
Greece 1981 – 68 % 67.3 %
Portugal 1985 – 56 % 83.1 %
Spain 1985 – 74 % 75.3 %
Source: European Commission, 2006.
Due to ERDF’s important contribution to closing the development gaps in Europe,
many scholars incorporate lessons learned from the European Union’s experience
into their proposals for a NAIF. One lesson is that creating a fund in which wealthi-
er countries are net contributors and poorer countries are net beneficiaries facili-
tates development in the poorer countries (Fiess and Fugazza, 2002; Pastor, 2002).
Another lesson is that the European Union had to address its regional imbalances
to prepare for deeper economic integration. Thus, some scholars, who support
deeper North America integration, argue that the U.S., Canada and Mexico should
create a NAIF in which the U.S. and Canada are net contributors and Mexico, the net
beneficiary. Scholars hope that an RDF would close the development gap among the
three countries. Reducing disparities among the countries, some scholars argue,
would create the potential for the North American free trade area to evolve into a
customs union or common market (Pastor, 2002). 
By focusing on its implementation, scholars have overlooked another impor-
tant lesson that the ERDF’s experience provides: how the ERDF came into force. In
their proposals for a NAIF, scholars have focused on its implementation: the use of
institutions and conditionality and the identification of project areas, among other
issues. Since their proposals have not yet gained enough political support to create
a NAIF, retracing the ERDF’s origins could provide a different approach on how a NAIF
proposal might be framed. A review of the theoretical literature related to the ERDF
sheds light on an alternative approach. 
THE THEORETICAL DEBATE
Competing theoretical approaches of convergence/neofunctionalism and side-pay-
ments/intergovernmentalism attempt to explain why wealthier member states
would agree to become net contributors to an RDF. These theories are rooted in the
context of the European Union’s integration process and the creation of the ERDF.
While other theoretical explanations could explain economic integration and the
creation of an RDF, scholars most commonly cite these particular theories (Fiess and
Fugazza, 2002; Leonardi, 1995; Pastor, 2002). 
Convergence and Neofunctionalist Theory
Convergence theory explains why a region could benefit from an RDF. Although this
theory has carried many other connotations in the past, its core principle is that as
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countries reach similar levels of economic development, their societies also become
more alike (Kerr et al., 1960; Robertson, 1992; Sorokin, 1960; Tinbergen, 1961). This
principle is rooted in the neoclassical growth theory, which explains that “countries
which are identical in terms of demographic development, saving habits and pro-
duction technologies, but differ in terms of their initial factor endowments display
a growth differential and meet the same level of output after convergence in factor
inputs has been achieved” (Tumpel-Gugerell quoted in Noltie, 2003: 1).
Convergence theory uses comparative advantage and economies of scale to
explain why capital, technology, and labor must move to where they will have the
highest returns. In the context of regional integration, it argues that when total fac-
tor mobility causes a concentration of the factors of production in wealthier areas,
the region should reallocate resources to favor disadvantaged areas. According to
convergence theory, an RDF facilitates the transfer of goods and capital to poorer
regions by building its infrastructure and growth potential. This transfer of resources
promotes more evenly distributed economic development in the region (Fiess and
Fugazza, 2002; Leonardi, 1995; Pastor, 2002).
Scholars use this premise to explain the ERDF’s impact on economic develop-
ment in the poorer countries. Leonardi explains the relationship between the ERDF
and economic development in the poorer countries by running a regression analy-
sis on numerous variables, which include the distance from the core countries, for-
eign investment, the industrialization level, the unemployment rate, and ERDF
funding (Leonardi, 1995: 133, 170-76). His study concludes that the ERDF “made a
substantial contribution to economic investment and overall GDP in the three nations.
[It explains] in part the surge of these countries toward convergence.” Additionally,
De la Fuente and Vives find that the ERDF significantly contributed to regional con-
vergence by improving public infrastructure (De la Fuente and Vives, 1995). 
Despite these findings, convergence theory’s ability to explain the ERDF’s im-
pact has its critics, who often point out that the single market, with its regulatory
obligations, and not the ERDF, was a stronger influence over the poorer countries’
economic growth. Separating the results of the ERDF from those of the single market
is extremely difficult, however, because it is impossible to say what would have
happened without the single market (Boldrin and Canova, 2001; Sapir, 2004). The
general consensus is that the poorer countries’ economic development resulted from
a combination of the single market and the ERDF, among other factors, and that the
single market would not have been possible without the ERDF.
Like convergence theorists, neofunctionalist theorists support the idea that states
in a regional integration scheme will experience economic, political, and social con-
vergence. Neofunctionalism is based on three principles: a “spillover” process, the
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assignment of central institutions to “inherently expansive” tasks, and member states’
willingness to “upgrade the common interest” (Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963). Spillover
refers to the way that elites, institutions, and interest groups convince member states
to adopt common policies that incrementally lead to deeper integration in new
areas to maximize their benefits from regional integration. Allowing central insti-
tutions to manage inherently expansive tasks means that member states hand over
their sovereignty in some areas to supranational institutions, understanding that
some matters are best managed at the supranational level. Upgrading the common
interest means that member states make decisions based on the region’s interests,
instead of national interests. These three principles, neofunctionalists argue, lead to
a gradual economic, political, and social convergence among the member states. 
Convergence theory’s economic arguments support a neofunctionalist recipe
for creating an RDF. The neofunctionalist’s recipe is that economic integration cre-
ates the need for regional development through the spillover process; member states
overlook losses to the RDF at the national level and focus on how it would benefit
the community; and member states assign central institutions to manage an RDF.
Convergence theory explains how countries reach similar levels of development
with an RDF, while neofunctionalism provides an explanation for why member
states would create an RDF. From a neofunctionalist’s perspective, economic inte-
gration in regions with uneven development creates the need for an RDF, because,
according to convergence theory, a redistribution of inputs would maximize each
country’s outputs and is thus in the community’s interest. Convergence and neo-
functionalist theory assume that countries are willing to put the community’s inter-
est before their own immediate interests, which can be a weakness when the region
involves countries with strong national interests.
Intergovernmentalism and Side-Payments
Intergovernmentalist theory provides a different recipe for creating an RDF. In-
tergovernmentalism focuses solely on states’ interests and argues that states are the
dominant actors in the community decision-making process. It argues that states
act as “gatekeepers” to block legislation that is not directly in their national interest
(Sutcliffe, 2000: 292; Moravcsik, 1993). It also criticizes neofunctionalist logic, claim-
ing that:
The whole spillover process is a fiduciary operation: “you and I accept today a measure
that gives us less than you and I have hoped for because each of us expects our conces-
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sions of today to be repaid tomorrow on another issue.” Now, a day must come when
the reckoning has to be done and the credit is exhausted (Hoffmann, 1964: 89).
Intergovernmentalists reject the spillover process and support the idea that
states cling to their national sovereignty and strike bargains with other states to
maximize their gains. Hence, intergovernmentalism provides a recipe of side-pay-
ments to create an RDF.
Side-payment analysis explains that an RDF is a quid pro quo between states to
prevent the recipient countries from blocking decisions in another area. This analysis
argues that net-contributing member states will not create an RDF unless it allows
them to advance their interests in another area. In the case of the ERDF, side-payment
analysis argues that the fund was a pay-off from the wealthier countries that wanted
deeper integration to the poorer countries that anticipated risks and losses and that
could have vetoed steps toward such goals (Marks, 1992; Pollack, 1995). From this
perspective, an RDF results from intergovernmental bargaining and states basing their
decisions on national, rather than community interests. Applying side-payment analy-
sis to the ERDF reveals new lessons from the European Union’s case for North America. 
APPLICATION TO THE ERDF
Which of these theories best explains how the ERDF came about in the European
Union? In the European Union’s case, the neofunctionalist hypothesis for how the
ERDF would come about lacks evidence. According to cohesion/neofunctionalist
theory, the ERDF would result from elites, businesses, and interest groups advocat-
ing its creation; central institutions needing jurisdiction in regional development to
carry out their other duties; and European Union member states acting out of cohe-
sion and solidarity and realizing that the ERDF would benefit the community as a
whole. The European Union’s formal commitment to cohesion and solidarity in 1961
seems to support this recipe, but the ERDF did not take effect until nearly 15 years later.
The Commission drew up an Action Programme in 1962, recommending that states
address regional imbalances that impede free trade in the common market. The
Empty Chair Crisis, in which France boycotted the European Union for seven months,
overshadowed this proposal. When the Commission made a second attempt to
float the idea in the 1970s, it crafted its proposal for the ERDF around member states’
interests (Cosgrove, 1970). European Union member states did not value the com-
munity’s interest over their own immediate national interests, thus discrediting the
neofunctionalist’s hypothesis.
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Ultimately, European Union member states’ national interests dictated the
ERDF’s creation. According to side-payment/intergovernmentalist theory, the ERDF
would result from bargains between member states that make decisions based on their
own immediate national interests. The ERDF that resulted in 1975 did not reflect the
European Union member states’ commitment to regional development or solidari-
ty and instead resembled “pork-barrel politics” (Wallace, 1977). The Commission
catered to member states’ interests and the ERDF became a side-payment from wealth-
ier countries to the poorer and accession countries. 
Contrary to the goal of convergence, the Commission arranged for the wealth-
iest member states to receive almost as much as the poorest member states in order
for the ERDF to pass. The Council, which is composed of the member states’ heads
of state or government and ministers representing their national interests, had to
approve of the ERDF for it to take effect, and any member state could veto the pro-
posal. When the Commission’s proposal for regional development did not receive
a wide response in the 1960s, it re-designed its strategy in the 1970s to satisfy the
interests of key member states. Its new proposal favored France, the United Kingdom
(U.K.), Italy, and Ireland, as shown in Chart 1. Italy and Ireland were the poorest
member states. France was a net-benefactor because it did not want to create the
ERDF and preferred disbursing aid through the European Investment Bank (EIB). For
the U.K., whose population was ambivalent about European Union membership,
the ERDF was a payoff for joining. The logic was that the ERDF would be in these
countries’ national interests; thus, they would strike bargains with the other countries
to see it come into force (Wallace, 1977: 146-48). 
For the accession countries, the ERDF was a side-payment for joining the Euro-
pean Union. As net beneficiaries, the U.K. and Ireland were highly supportive of
the ERDF. The ERDF’s support for industrial regions in decline meant that the U.K.
could nurse its faltering industries, which was one of its main goals in the 1970s.
Also, the U.K. was eager to convince its citizens of the benefits of European Union
membership and the ERDF provided tangible results (Wallace, 1977; Dinan, 1999).
Ireland strongly favored the ERDF and used its presidency in the Council of Min-
isters to push for a final deal on the ERDF in 1975. The ERDF’s role as a side-payment
to the accession countries and the accession countries’ support for the ERDF’s adop-
tion were important factors in its creation.
Other member states saw the ERDF as a rebate for their contributions to the
European Union’s budget. Member states gave the European Union its “own
resources” in 1970, which consist of levies on agricultural goods, duties on indus-
trial goods, and a 1 percent portion of national revenues from value-added tax (Dinan,
1999: 62). The funding method for the European Union’s own resources was con-
106
NINA PEACOCK
NORTEAMÉRICA
tentious for the U.K., because it imported the most agricultural and industrial
goods from outside the European Union, which would make it a net contributor to
the union. Germany, which was also a net contributor, wanted to see “le juste retour”
for its contributions to the European Union’s own resources in the form of grants
from the ERDF (Wallace, 1977: 141). In reaction to their obligatory payments to the
European Union’s own resources, the wealthier member states were more concerned
with receiving their fair share of the ERDF as a rebate for their contributions than
they were with regional development.
Additionally, wealthier member states, like Germany, that benefited less from
the fund saw the ERDF as a side-payment to poorer member states which might try
to block the European Monetary Union’s (EMU) creation. EMU meant that member
states would eventually peg their currencies to the same exchange rate, centralize
their monetary policy at the European Union level, and share the same currency.
Like the ERDF, EMU would also require unanimity. Wealthier member states, like
Germany, anticipated benefiting from EMU, but realized that its creation would be
unfeasible without first establishing a regional development policy. The Werner Com-
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Chart 1
THE 1975 DISTRIBUTION OF THE ERDF BY COUNTRY
Source: Commission to the European Parliament and Council, 1976.
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mittee’s report found that unresolved regional imbalances would lead to unequal
gains from EMU.3 It suggested managing regional development policy at the com-
munity level to prepare for EMU. Germany understood the bargain it would have to
make. Thus, Germany’s finance minister argued that an effort to develop poorer
regions in the European Union would only be possible if it were tied to EMU (Wallace,
1977: 141-50). Due to the Werner Committee’s recommendation, the ERDF was Ger-
many’s side-payment to poorer member states for their support for EMU. 
Retracing the origins of the ERDF shows that states’ interests and intergovern-
mental bargains mainly drove its creation. Cohesion and neofunctionalist theories
cannot account for the bargains struck between member states that ultimately
resulted in the ERDF’s creation. Although they were necessary factors, cohesion and
solidarity were secondary to the member states’ self-interests in the ERDF’s creation.
Thus, side-payment analysis and intergovernmentalist theory best explain the key
factors that brought about the ERDF. 
APPLICATION OF COHESION/NEOFUNCTIONALISM TO THE NAIF
Which of these theories could best explain how a NAIF might come about in North
America? According to cohesion/neofunctionalist theory, a NAIF would result from
elites, businesses, and pressure groups advocating its creation; central institutions
needing jurisdiction in regional development to fully carry out their other duties;
and NAFTA countries acting out of cohesion and solidarity and realizing that a NAIF
would benefit the community as a whole.
Thus far, the cohesion/neofunctionalist argument has not proved to be very
strong in this case either. To no avail, elites and pressure groups have advocated
creating a NAIF. Composed of cabinet-level ministers from the three countries and
sponsored by prominent think tanks, the Independent Task Force on the Future of
North America advocated creating a North American Investment Fund (NAIF). Their
version of the NAIF would develop the poorest regions of Mexico through grants
and supplemental funding from Mexico (Independent Task Force on the Future of
North America, 2005). 
The Independent Task Force on the Future of North America has not yet suc-
ceeded in steering the trilateral dialogue in the direction of regional development and
deeper economic integration. Prior to the Waco Conference among the leaders of the
three countries, the Independent Task Force on the Future of North America pre-
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3 In 1972, European Union member states put together a committee, chaired by Luxembourg’s Prime Minister
Pierre Werner, to explore how the community could implement EMU.
sented its case for the NAIF and other policies that would deepen North America’s
integration (Independent Task Force on the Future of North America, 2005). The U.S.’s
reaction to the September 11 terrorist attacks eclipsed elites and interest groups’ NAIF
proposals and the leaders did not discuss the topic at the Waco Conference (Baker,
2005). 
Pastor’s policy proposals draw on the neofunctionalist logic that, once begun,
the integration process creates the need for more integration. Pastor argued before the
U.S. House of Representatives International Relations Committee that maintaining
the status quo in North America is not sustainable. His focus was that a NAIF would
allow the three countries to “develop a true trilateral partnership” and would resolve
the issue of undocumented migration from Mexico to the U.S. (Pastor, 2003: 4). Pastor’s
discourse also argues that North America could fully benefit from integration by
creating a North American Commission, North American Parliamentary Group,
North American passport, North American Customs Union, North American Court on
Trade and Investment, and North American monetary union that uses the “amero”
(Pastor, 2001). His proposal relies on the wealthier North American countries put-
ting the community’s interests before their own immediate interests.
The U.S. and Canada are not yet dedicated enough to the principles of cohe-
sion and solidarity to put the community’s interests before their own immediate
interests. Mexican President Vicente Fox approached President George W. Bush in
2001 to propose a North American convergence scheme “whereby the Mexican econ-
omy has to converge on fundamental variables with the U.S. and Canadian economy”
carried out through a North American Development Fund (Fox, 2001). The U.S. was
not fully receptive to Mexico’s proposal for a NAIF. Instead, the two presidents made
a general statement of principle “to consolidate a North American economic com-
munity whose benefits reach the lesser-developed areas of the region and extend to
the most vulnerable social groups in [their] countries” (Bush and Fox, 2001). 
Despite the two presidents’ statement of principle, fast actions toward creating
a NAIF did not follow. Consistent with President Bush and President Fox’s joint
statement, U.S. Senator John Cornyn proposed authorization for the president to
negotiate a North American Investment Fund in 2004 (Cornyn, 2004). The bill has
been referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Thus, it may still be too early
to tell if the U.S. and Mexico’s commitment to convergence is satisfactory for the
creation of an RDF. Five years after the two presidents’ joint statement, however, a
NAIF has still not yet come into being. Examining states’ interests in this case could
explain why. 
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STATES’ INTERESTS IN NAFTA
Given the U.S. and Canada’s reluctance to become net contributors to a NAIF, state
interests seem to play an important role in its creation. Like the European Union
case, the wealthier countries in North America see a NAIF as a financial burden. As
Weintraub points out, “The belief that some form of development fund is needed
to help speed the development process in Mexico is now receiving widespread sup-
port –except from the U.S. government, which would have to supply most of the
funds” (Weintraub, 2005). 
A senior U.S. official commented to the L.A. Times, “This is not an administra-
tion that is in the realistic position of providing massive support to Mexico. We’re
no longer in the business of Marshall Plans in the United States. The political real-
ities on the ground just are not in favor of this” (Schrader, 2003). Without clear U.S.
support for the project, Canada has not considered becoming a net contributor
either. Given its distance from the Mexican border, Canada has even less interest
than the U.S. in developing a trilateral NAIF.
Beyond the financial reasons for their hesitations, the U.S. also has political mo-
tives for its lack of enthusiasm over the NAIF. It would rather work bilaterally with
Mexico and reform the North American Development Bank (NadBank). NadBank
funds infrastructure, environmental, and water projects within 62 miles north of and
186 miles south of the U.S.-Mexico border (NadBank.org, 2004). In support of NadBank
reforms, Washington agreed to create a new U.S.$50 million fund for environmental
infrastructure and water projects (Hutchinson, 2004). The U.S. sees working through
NadBank or bilaterally with Mexico as more efficient than incorporating or creat-
ing new areas in North America.
Canada also prefers a bilateral approach to deepening the North American
Free trade area. Despite its NAFTA membership, Canada tends to think of North
America primarily in terms of its relationship with the U.S. As Robert Keyes, the
vice-president of the International Division of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce
stated before the Canadian Parliament, “As we look at this issue of Canada-U.S.-
Mexico...Canada-Mexico is a long way behind where the Canada-U.S. relationship
is, and that has to be our primary focus” (Keyes, 2002). 
Although the Canadian government is supportive of further North American
integration, Canadian elites and interest groups favor deepening the bilateral eco-
nomic relationship with the U.S., rather than building on the trilateral relationship.
Some scholars are even hesitant about pursuing this course of action for fear of
being dominated by the U.S. (Campbell, 2003). Other scholars propose deepening
bilateral economic integration with the U.S. to develop a customs union or a com-
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mon market and including Mexico later (Canadian Council of Chief Executives,
2003; Dobson, 2002: 7-9; Gotlieb, 2003: 25-30). In both cases, elites and interest groups
focus on the U.S.-Canadian relationship in North America, rather than building a
strong trilateral relationship. 
Canada and the U.S.’s resistance to cohesion and solidarity arguments and their
preferences for a bilateral approach to addressing the challenges posed by economic
integration contradict the cohesion/neofunctionalist hypothesis for the creation of an RDF.
Contrary to the neofunctionalist logic that more regional integration can solve the
challenges created by regional integration, elites and interest groups in Canada and
the U.S. government argue that these challenges are best handled bilaterally. Like the
European Union case, cohesion and solidarity arguments have not been sufficient fac-
tors to motivate wealthier countries to become net contributors. North America’s region-
al politics and the U.S. and Canada’s stances on deepening North American integration
suggest that an intergovernmentalist approach to creating a NAIF is more informative. 
KEY DIFFERENCES IN AN INTERGOVERNMENTALIST APPROACH
Based on the intergovernmentalist hypothesis for the creation of an RDF, a NAIF will
result from bargains and side-payments between the countries of North America,
which will be different from those that occurred in the European Union case. The
decision to create the ERDF in Europe largely depended upon the Commission’s activ-
ism, the incorporation of the U.K. and Ireland, the creation of the European Union’s
own resources, and wealthier member states’ interest in creating the EMU. North Amer-
ica may face inexact but similar circumstances, such as elites and interest groups’ activ-
ism, extending an agreement to Central and South America, funding for the NAFTA
secretariats, and a country that supports deeper integration. But these circumstances
are not likely to lead to the creation of a NAIF. Examining how these factors affect the
regional dynamics in North America’s case provides insight on how one can create
an intergovernmentalist-informed proposal for a NAIF.
In North America, there is no central institution that can craft regional legislation
for NAFTA, but elites and interest groups could be an alternative. The Commission
played a key role in the European Union’s evolution, because its main role was to
advocate for Europe’s interest above national interests. An agent able to lobby for
the community’s interest is necessary for an RDF to occur, because it can set goals  and
propose bargains that balance the interests of member states to reach those goals.
In North America, North American community-minded elites and interest groups
are the closest alternative to having a supranational body that can propose legisla-
tion, because some of them base their policy suggestions on North America’s inter-
ests rather than national interests. 
They must explore more ways to influence member states’ interests to gain sup-
port for a NAIF. Thus far, their influence has been limited, however, as the outcome
of the Waco Conference demonstrated. But even the Commission faced similar lim-
itations in the 1960s, when the Empty Chair Crisis overshadowed its first ERDF pro-
posal. The European Union and North America’s cases show that timing and having
a community-oriented body that can tailor a strategy to meet the interests of mem-
ber states are important. 
Enlargement was another important ingredient for the ERDF in the European
Union’s case, which is not entirely applicable to North America. In Europe’s case, the
incorporation of the U.K. and Ireland added two countries with an intense interest in
seeing the ERDF take shape and the bargaining power to sway other member states’
interests. In North America, all three NAFTA countries’ bilateral negotiation of free trade
agreements (FTAs) with certain Central and South American countries is the closest
equivalent to enlargement. The U.S., Canada, and Mexico have concluded bilateral
FTAs with the Central American Free Trade Area (CAFTA), which creates a de facto en-
largement of NAFTA. These agreements are not likely to create the same dynamics,
however, because they are bilaterally based and not a trilateral extension of NAFTA. 
Similarly, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which would constitute a
trilateral extension of NAFTA, is also not likely to stimulate interest in a NAIF. In fact,
the FTAA would likely draw attention away from North America’s regional devel-
opment. As Weintraub asserts, “widening” NAFTA by concluding the FTAA would
result in a weaker form of regional integration than “deepening” NAFTA with more
harmonized regulations and central policies (Weintraub, 1994: 56-104). If regional
development does become part of the FTAA negotiations, it will likely be channeled
through the existing Organization for American States (OAS) and the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB), rather than through a NAIF. 
The fact that the European Union created resources of its own was also a key
ingredient for the ERDF, and the absence of a NAFTA community budget adds to the
lack of incentive for the wealthier states to create a NAIF. NAFTA does not have any
community-funded, central institutions. The U.S., Canada, and Mexico are respon-
sible for funding the secretariat representations in each country. They are free to
determine the amount of funding themselves, since the treaty sets no minimum require-
ments (NAFTA, 1994). The North American countries’ interests are different from the
European Union countries’ interests of the 1970s, because they have full control over
the funds that they give to NAFTA. Since their contributions to NAFTA are in self-deter-
mined amounts, they have less incentive to look for rebates through a NAIF. 
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North America does not have the same regional dynamics that Europe did in
the 1970s. In contrast to the European Union case in which the wealthier countries
anticipated large gains from deeper economic integration, the poorer country in
North America favors deeper trilateral integration and the wealthier countries favor
deeper bilateral integration. This dynamic creates a key contrast between the two
cases. In the European Union’s case, the wealthier countries’ interest in creating deep-
er economic integration led them to offer the ERDF as a side-payment to the poorer
countries in exchange for their cooperation on EMU. In North America’s case, Mexico
has been asking the U.S. and Canada for deeper trilateral integration, or “NAFTA -plus,”
and the wealthier countries are the ones that are hesitant about the implications of
deeper integration (Pickard, 2005). 
One of the key incentives that motivated wealthier European Union member
states to create the ERDF does not exist in North America’s case. Proponents of a NAIF
must embrace the financial and political differences that exist between the European
Union and NAFTA and explore other possible side-payments among the countries of
North America. 
POSSIBLE SIDE-PAYMENTS FOR NORTH AMERICA
This reversed dynamic, in which the poorer country favors regional integration
while the wealthier countries do not, means that Mexico will have to satisfy the U.S.
and Canada’s interests in another area in order to receive a NAIF as a side-payment.
If member states’ interests are to dictate the creation of an RDF in NAFTA’s case, Mex-
ico might need to make concessions on its labor standards, environmental policies,
and border cooperation to receive an RDF as a side-payment. 
Mexico has already had to satisfy the U.S. and Canada’s interests before inte-
gration could take place. U.S. labor unions, environmentalists, and free-trade critics
were concerned that Mexico’s comparative lack of labor and environmental regula-
tions would give it an unfair comparative advantage and lead to trade distortion.
Thus, the U.S. tied its agreement to the NAFTA treaty to two side agreements, which
created the North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC) and
the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) (National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers, 1998). According to intergovernmentalist theory, Mexico
may again have to make trade-offs to the U.S. in these two areas, and likely in bor-
der cooperation.
Mexico might have to meet Canada and the U.S.’s demands to enforce higher
labor standards. Mexico has currently agreed to the 11 common labor principles of
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the NAALC, which include equal pay for men and women and limitations on child
labor, and the Singapore World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Declaration
on workers’ rights. The problem is that Mexico was quick to incorporate the prin-
ciples into its Constitution and laws, but slow to put them in practice. For example,
its Constitution and laws respect trade union rights and the freedom of association,
but the right to strike and the right to organize are not always recognized in practice,
which weakens the labor unions’ power to bargain for workers’ rights (International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 1997). Canada and the U.S. could ask that
Mexico reinforce its efforts to respect the rights of unions in practice. Greater assur-
ance that Mexican industries adhere to the NAALC and the WTO’s labor principles
would guarantee improved working conditions and labor standards in Mexico and
fairer competition for Canadian and U.S. laborers. 
The U.S. and Canada could ask Mexico to put its respect for environmental
regulations into practice. Mexico and the U.S. currently work together to address
border environmental issues and they have made some improvements in enforcing
environmental regulations, but population expansion and economic transforma-
tion have outpaced the U.S. and Mexico’s efforts. Residents along the U.S.-Mexican
border complain about poor air quality from vehicle emissions and brick-kiln burn-
ings in Tecate, untreated sewage that affects the water quality, and waste pollution
in the Conchos and Rio Grande basins (Environmental Protection Agency, 2006). In
March 2004, President Fox announced a one-year moratorium on environmental
regulations to increase investment and employment. As a result, many laws and reg-
ulations on environmental protection that would have improved the health and
welfare of border towns were delayed (Jacott, Carlsen and Nauman, 2004). Given
the adverse environmental effects on its border towns, the U.S. could demand that
Mexico adopt and enforce stricter environmental laws and regulations in exchange
for agreement on a NAIF. This policy change would guarantee improved environ-
mental conditions along the U.S.-Mexican border.
Mexico may have to increase its cooperation with the U.S. to discourage illegal
emigration across their shared border. Illegal immigration from Mexico is a core
issue for the U.S. It would probably support a NAIF if it were tied to some assurance
that doing so would produce an immediate decrease in the flow of illegal immi-
gration from Mexico. The U.S. and Mexico already cooperate on regulating their
border, but they could strengthen this effort by spreading awareness of the risks of
illegal migration. Mexico has filmed four short videos on the risks of illegal migra-
tion that show in the Estrella Blanca buses heading toward the border. In conjunction
with the U.S.’s effort in its border towns, Mexico should spread its effort to communi-
cate the risks of illegal migration to the general public. A marketing campaign fully
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informing Mexican citizens of the risks of illegal migration could change some po-
tential migrants’ calculations of the expected risks and their decisions to go.
To justify receiving a NAIF as a side-payment for its cooperation on migration,
Mexico could adopt the stance that cooperation with the U.S. is not in its interest
because it could result in a loss of worker remittances. Mexico would have to pro-
ject what its losses in worker remittances might be from the U.S.’s new immigration
policy, once it is finalized. Mexico benefits greatly from people who have emigrated
to the U.S. and who send money back. In 2005, Mexico received more than U.S. 20
billion dollars in workers’ remittances, making it Mexico’s second source of foreign
currency income after oil exports (Banco de Mexico, 2006). This is equivalent to 28
times more than the amount of grants and loans that NadBank distributed in 2004
and two-thirds of the U.S.’s entire budget for international affairs, excluding fund-
ing for Iraq and Afghanistan, in the 2005 fiscal year (NadBank, 2004; Executive
Office of the President, 2005). Mexico could argue that it risks losing worker remit-
tances, a key source of its income, if it helps the U.S. tighten border controls. The
U.S. might then have an incentive to offer Mexico a NAIF as a side-payment.
If member states’ interests are to determine whether a NAIF takes effect, elites
and interest groups that support its creation must conduct a deeper investigation to
determine how these and other trade-offs might take place. Satisfying the interests
of the wealthier member states is a necessary condition for establishing a NAIF. Since
the wealthier countries’ interest in deeper economic integration does not apply to
North America’s case, North America will have to identify other ways to satisfy the
wealthier countries’ interests. 
CONCLUSION
The lesson that scholars often overlook when they apply lessons from the ERDF to
North America is that its creation depended on the poorer member states satisfying
wealthier member states’ interests in another area and receiving the ERDF as a side-
payment. Retracing the ERDF’s origins shows that cohesion and solidarity were nec-
essary, but not sufficient, factors in its creation. Pastor acknowledges this when he
states, “[A] clear statement of goals is necessary but not sufficient to construct a
community of nations” (Pastor, 2002). Like the European Union’s case, declaring
their commitment to cohesion and solidarity will not be enough to persuade North
American countries to adopt a NAIF. Elites and interest groups that support the cre-
ation of a NAIF should explore the possible bargains that could take place between
the three countries that would balance their interests. A NAIF does not necessarily
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need to come about as a side-payment, but given the regional dynamics in North
America, this method seems the most likely.
Applying integration theories to the ERDF and using them to hypothesize how
a NAIF might come about in North America provides guidance for NAIF proponents.
Neofunctionalism and cohesion theory had a limited ability to explain why the ERDF
came into force, and their hypothesis for how a NAIF might take shape in North
America seems unlikely, given the current regional dynamics. Intergovernmentalism
and side-payments theory has more explanatory power in both cases. 
As an integral element to the ERDF’s creation, North America scholars must take
into account intergovernmentalist and side-payment theory’s implications when
basing their proposals for a NAIF on the ERDF. Enhanced environmental, labor, and
border cooperation are three possible intergovernmentalist trade-offs that could take
place in North America. These bargains and others deserve further exploration, be-
cause, as the European Union’s case has shown, an RDF has the potential to signifi-
cantly reduce wealth disparities among countries. 
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Appendix 1
REVIEW OF THEORIES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO THE EU AND NAFTA
Convergence/ Side-Payments/
Neofunctionalism Intergovernmentalism
General Hypothesis
Hypothesis in EU
Hypothesis in North
America
Evidence in EU
Evidence in North
America
RDFs come about from elites,
interest groups, central institutions,
upgrading the common interest,
spillovers
Elites, business and interest groups
advocate the creation of RDF
Central institutions need more
jurisdiction
Cohesion and solidarity influence
countries to act in the community’s
interest
Elites, business and interest
groups advocate creation of RDF
Cohesion and solidarity are guiding
principles
1961 EU member states made a
commitment to cohesion and
solidarity; nearly 15 years later
the ERDF came about 
Independent Task Force on the
Future of North America lobbied
governments before the Waco
Conference
Bush and Fox’s joint statement on
cohesion in 2001, no NAIF yet 
Countries act in their own inter-
ests when creating an RDF
RDFs serve as a side-payment
when countries’ interests are not
directly satisfied from its creation
Countries bargain and make
side-payments to satisfy their
own immediate interests
Countries bargain and make
side-payments and trade-offs to
satisfy their interests
Wealthiest countries received
large proportion of funds
Side-payment to accession
countries
Seen as rebate from the EU
budget
Tied to EMU
Mexico made trade-offs to the
U.S. and Canada for NAFTA to
come into force
Regional dynamics suggest that
trade-offs may be necessary for
a NAIF
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